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LITERARY TITLES - COPYRIGHTABLE OR
TRADEMARKABLE*
Literary titles are neither subject to copyright registration themselves
nor included in the copyright of the work' obtainable under the Federal
Copyright Act. 2 Similarly, titles of single publications are denied registration under the Trademark Act, 3 although series titles have received some
degree of protection. Thus, prior to the recent decisions of Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co. 4 and its companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.,5 state laws of unfair competition had generally been regarded as affording the most pervasive protection6 to holders of literary
titles. These cases, however, have created serious doubts as to the permissible extent of this protection.
It is the purpose of this comment to re-evaluate the adequacy of
existing protection of single literary titles, particularly those of books,
newspaper and magazine columns in light of the Sears and Compco decisions, and to evaluate the possibility as well as the advisability of extending federal protection to such titles.
I.

COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION

The copyright and patent clause, article I, section 8, of the United
States Constitution, grants Congress the power "to promote the progress
of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and
inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries."
Pursuant to this grant, Congress has passed several Copyright Acts, 7 the
most recent of which grants an author the exclusive right to print, reprint,
publish, copy and vend" all his writings 9 for a limited time. 10 The purpose
of this enactment, to encourage the production of literary work in the
arts and sciences by affording protection for intellectual endeavor, is to
be accomplished without burdensome requirements" and, after the statutory period has expired, the work is to be dedicated to public use.
* This comment has received the Nathan Burkan Memorial Award for articles
written on phases of copyright law.

1. 3 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 83.2(b) (2d ed. 1950).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964).
3. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964). The discussion of trademark registration in the comment will be with respect to the Principal Register and
not the Supplemental Register.
4. 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
5. 376 U.S. 234, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
6. See Netterville & Hirsch, Piracy and Privilege in Literary Titles, 32 So. CAL.
L.REv. 101, 117-36 (1959).
7. The first Copyright Act was enacted into law May 31, 1790. See HOWELL,
COPYRIGHT LAW 2, note 21 (3d ed. 1952).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1964).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1964).
10. The duration of a copyright is twenty-eight years from the date of first publication with an optional extension for another twenty-eight-year period. 17 U.S.C. § 24
(1964).
11. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939), rehearing
denied, 306 U.S. 668 (1939).
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The statute itself does not specifically exclude registration of a
literary title; on the contrary, it is susceptible to a literal reading which
would indicate the permissible inclusion of a title under section 4, which
states: "The works for which copyright may be secured under this title
2
shall include all the writings of an author."'
13
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held in the Trade-Mark cases
that the word "writing" as used in the copyright clause refers only to
such writings as are original and result from intellectual labor, and not
to those which merely advertise or designate the subject to which they are
attached. The reason for this exclusion has been concisely summarized in
regulations of the Copyright Office which categorize titles with names, slogans, ideas and plans in a class of works which consist solely of information
which are common property and contain no original authorship.' 4 This
declaration, which has been regarded as "a fair summary of the law"' 5
in conformity with judicial decision since 1850,16 has been the basis for
holding titles to be beyond the possible protection of the Copyright Act.
This result, however, fails to take into account the originality of
some individual titles as well as the intellectual labor expended to devise
a title with public appeal.' 7 Nor do they consider that, through the
medium of advertising, titles have acquired notable value and have become a readily marketable item.' 8 Such pecuniary interest achieved by
an author's efforts would appear to be equally worthy of protection.
Furthermore, while the decisions make it clear that titles are beyond
the scope of the Copyright Act, some doubt remains as to whether they
are beyond the purview of the copyright clause itself, even considering
the pronouncement in the Trade-Mark cases. The restrictive standard of
originality developed in those cases has apparently been discarded in
favor of an objective standard which would require an author merely to
demonstrate that the work was his creation, thus obviating the need for
12. 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1964). (Emphasis added.) Applications for registration must
specify to which class the work in which a copyright is claimed belongs. Two of the
enumerated classes are books and periodicals, including newspapers. 17 U.S.C. § 5(a),
(b) (1964). The Register of Copyright's proposed copyright revision bill of 1965
changes "all writings" to "original works of authorship." HousE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION, pt. 6, at 174 (Comm.
Print 1965) (hereinafter cited as 1965 COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION).
13. United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
14. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (Supp. 1965). The Registrar of Copyrights has the authority
under 17 U.S.C. § 207 (1964) to promulgate such rules and regulations for the registration of claims to copyright.

15. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Food Corp., 266 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1959).
16. Jollie v. Jacques, 13 Fed. Cas. 910 (No. 7437) (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1850). The
Court, in holding that the title of a musical composition was not subject to copyright
protection, stated at p. 914: "The right secured is the property in the piece of music,

the production of the mind and genius of the author, and not in the mere name given
to the work."

17. Some believe that the most original contributions of the author Thomas Wolfe

were his titles, e.g., LOOK HOMEWARD ANGEL; YOU CAN'T Go HOME AGAIN; OF TIME
AND THE RIVER.

18. See Klein, Is Unauthorized Use of Titles of Artistic Works in Unrelated
Fields Actionable Piracy?, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 59, 67 (1961).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol11/iss4/11

2

John: Literacy Titles - Copyrightable or Trademarkable
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

11

meeting the more subjective standard of aesthetic and educational value. 19
Under such an interpretation, Congress could constitutionally protect
20
titles as "writings" within the copyright clause.
This is not to suggest, however, that such protection should be extended as a matter of course. Admittedly, not all titles are distinctive and
original; but the exclusion of some merely descriptive titles from copyright registration should not necessitate the exclusion of all. For this
reason, a number of foreign jurisdictions have adopted an intermediary
approach and distinguish non-original titles from those which are original
and distinctive, affording protection to the latter. 21 The desirability of
adopting legislation to accomplish this end will be discussed more fully in
following pages.
Finally, the common law copyright also fails to afford an author
adequate protection of his title. 22 Publication of an uncopyrightable title,
even though it might still qualify as a writing under the Constitution in
light of the Bleistein case, would nonetheless be a forfeiture of the common
law right.

23

Consequently, authors have been forced to look to other areas of the
law to secure protection of their titles. One possibility, where some titles
have been held to be registrable, is the Federal Trademark Act, the
24

Lanham Act.

19. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). In the
majority opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, copyright protection was granted to chromolithographs for advertising a circus. The opinion indicated that the article only need
be the original work of the designer. Mr. Justice Holmes stated at pp. 251-52:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive
until the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke ...
[y]et if they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value, it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value ...
20. Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of
Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARv. L. Rev. 1079, 1115 (1959).
21. Belgium, Egypt and France grant copyright protection if the title is original
and is a personal intellectual creation. Guatemala protects a title if it is distinctive,
while Mexico protects titles of a newspaper, magazine or any other serial publications.
Dubin, Motion Pictures - Rights United States and International,28 So. CAL. L. Rev.
205, 214 (1955).
22. In Edgar H. Wood Assoc. v. Skene, 347 Mass. 351, 197 N.E.2d 886 (1964),
the court held that Sears and Compco do not require abandonment of state protection
afforded to unpublished material.
23. RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1940), ccrt. denied,
311 U.S. 712 (1940). Judge L. Hand stated:
[W]e see no reason why the same acts that unconditionally dedicate the commonlaw copyright in works copyrightable under the act, should not do the same in
the case of works not copyrightable. . . . Any relief which justice demands must
be found in extending statutory copyright to such works, not in recognizing
perpetual monopolies, however limited their scope.
Although state competence to define publication has not been doubted, it has been
suggested that the Sears and Compco cases indicate that this area is also preempted.
Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Compco Cases, 32 U. Cm. L.
Rev. 80, 89 (1964).
24. 60 Stat. 427 (1946). 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964).
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II.

TRADEMARK REGISTRATION

The first Trademark Act, enacted by Congress in 1870,25 provided for
registration by a person who had acquired the exclusive right to a trademark through usage, and created a cause of action for infringement
thereof. 26 However, that act was declared unconstitutional in the Trademark cases, 27 where it was held that trademarks did not qualify under
the copyright clause since the basis for trademarkability was usage rather
than "originality, invention, discovery, or intellectual labor." Nor did
the commerce clause 8 validate this particular statute, as it was not limited
to interstate commerce, but envisaged a universal system. Subsequent
federal trademark regulations, including the present-day statute, have been
passed under the authority of the commerce clause, their scope being
limited to articles in interstate commerce.
A.

Book Titles

For registration under the Lanham Act, a term or phrase must first
distinguish applicants' goods in commerce from all others, rather than be
"merely descriptive of the goods or deceptively misdescriptive" 29 of it. With
these standards as a guideline, titles to individual literary works have been
denied registration as trademarks. 30
The case of In re Cooper3l illustrates the position of the courts. In
that case applicant sought to register the arbitrary title "Teeny-Big" as a
trademark for his juvenile book. Analogizing the title of a book to
"oranges" and "canned beans," common names of products, rather than
"Sunkist" oranges or "Heinz" canned beans, the products' trademark, the
court held that a title is merely descriptive of the goods and does not
perform a trademark function.
The court's argument was founded on the proposition that even though
a title is arbitrary and fanciful in that it is not descriptive of the contents
of a book, it is the only name for the book, and is therefore descriptive of
it. And names which either denote the article or describe its contents are
"descriptive" of that article within the statutory meaning of the word.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Worley took the position that a
mark cannot be both arbitrary and, at the same time, descriptive of the
goods. Thus, the basic disagreement revolved about the definition to be
attached to the term "descriptive." The dissenting opinion would permit
registration whenever the title is arbitrary and fanciful, rather than being
25. 16 Stat. 198 (1870).
26. 19 Stat. 141 (1876), provided for a fine and imprisonment for unlawful use.
27. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
28. U.S. CONST.art. I,§ 8.
29. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1964).
30. In re National Council Books, Inc., 121 U.S.P.Q. 198 (P.O. TM.T.App. Bd.
1959); In re Commonwealth Engineering Co. of Ohio, 120 U.S.P.Q. 415 (P.O.TM.T.
App. Bd. 1959).
31. 254 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
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descriptive of the contents of the book, while the majority would deny
registration to all titles on the theory that they are necessarily descriptive
of the book as an object.
The validity of the majority's position must be examined in light of
the general policy behind the exclusion of descriptive or generic terms from
trademark protection. The rationale appears to be that to confer the
exclusive right to the use of such a term would preclude others from exer32
cising their right to use the proper word to describe a similar product.
This necessarily presupposes a class of similar products susceptible to
designation by the same descriptive term. However, it is at least arguable
that an arbitrary book title is specific to that book, and is not a term to be
properly used in describing similar books. Indeed, it would seem to be
more palatable to hold that terms such as "western," "historical novel," or
"juvenile" constitute the class of generic terms properly excluded from
trademark protection.3 3 Nevertheless, this analysis does not obviate the
persuasive policy objection that it would preclude another from using the
only name the work has.
A mark which does not perform a technical trademark function, that
is, one which indicates the origin or source of the product rather than the
product itself, might nevertheless be afforded trademark protection where
it acquires secondary meaning. Literary titles, however, are more commonly associated with the qualities and characteristics of a product rather
than its source. Even if the public were to make a source association,
it would more likely be with the author than the publisher. Since the
courts have generally concluded that under the Lanham Act the identified
source must be the publisher 34 trademark registration has been denied.
Finally, even if secondary meaning were established, 3 trademark protection would still be denied under the current interpretation of section
2(f) of the Lanham Act.36 While numerous decisions under state laws
37
of unfair competition have prohibited title duplication in such situations
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has distinguished between legally
significant and de facto secondary meaning. Accordingly, a mark which
is the common name of an article, such as an individual title, is deemed
32. Wise v. Bristol-Myers Co., 107 F. Supp. 800 (S.D. N.Y. 1952) ; Rainbow Art
Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 99 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.W.Va. 1951).
33. Cf. Nissen Trampoline Co. v. American Trampoline Co., 193 F. Supp. 745
(S.D. Iowa 1961).
34. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964), defines a trade-mark as a word,
etc., used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them
from those manufactured by others. The court defines manufacturer or merchant to
mean the publisher rather than the author, and for a valid trademark it must be associated with the publisher. However, if the contents of the book are the goods, it is
arguable that the author is the manufacturer.
35. Grove Laboratories, Inc. v. Approved Pharmaceutical Corp., 149 F. Supp. 86
(N.D.N.Y. 1957).
36. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1964).
37. Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433
(1950); Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187
P.2d 474 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Hemingway v. Film Alliance of the United States,
Inc., 174 Misc. 725, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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to fall within the former category, and is denied registration, even though it
8
has acquired secondary meaning.A
The basis for this distinction is the overriding public policy of preventing a monopoly and of insuring the public's right to call a product by
the only name it has.39 This reasoning appears to be sound, for the persuasive scope of the protection conferred by the Lanham Act would
effectively remove the title from the public domain for an indefinite period.
These objections disappear, however, when titles to a series of books
are an issue. A series title is not the name of any one book and is therefore
not in any sense descriptive of it. On the contrary, it performs a legitimate
trademark function by indicating that each book in the series originates
from the same source, the publisher. Consequently, they have been
40
analogized to titles of periodicals, and have been declared registrable.
Magazine and newspaper column titles, however, like individual book
titles, are denied registration; but several different considerations are
involved.
B.

Newspaper and Magazine Column Titles

1. Generally. - Although titles of newspapers and magazines are
registrable under the Lanham Act, titles to columns or sections contained
therein are not similarly protected, primarily because they are not "goods"
for purposes of the act. For a trademark to function as such, it must be
used by the publisher to identify his goods and to distinguish them from
those of others.41 Ordinarily, newspapers and magazines, and not the
particular parts thereof, are considered "goods." Consequently, before
they can qualify as "goods," the publisher must show that the column or
section title was adopted to distinguish it from those of another's magazine,
and overcome the inference that it was adopted merely to distinguish
sections within his own magazine.
Clearly a particular section or column may be so advertised and
42
promoted that the public will become aware of it as a separate commodity.
Once this is established, however, the publisher must further show that
the title is not merely descriptive, but has attained such distinctiveness
that a reader associates the title and thus the magazine with the publisher.
To establish such distinctiveness would be difficult in light of the
In re Cooper interpretation of "descriptive," for such a title is also the
name of the article, and therefore descriptive of it. Nevertheless, since most
promoted columns or sections relate to series, analogy can be made to the
series title of a set of books, thus evading the In re Cooper problem.
38. Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845 (C.C.P.A.
1961) ; accord, DeWalt Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp., 289 F.2d 656 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
39. DeWalt Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp., 289 F.2d 656 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
40. In re Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 615 (C.C.P.A. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840
(1958).
41. In re Broadcasting Publications, Inc., 135 U.S.P.Q. 374 (P.O. TM. T. App.
Bd. 1962) ; Ex parte Meredith Publishing Co., 109 U.S.P.Q. 426 (Comm'r Pat. 1956).
42. Hancock, Notes from the Patent Office, 53 T.M.R. 568 (1959).
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2. Author's Name as a Title. - A separate problem with respect
to the registration of newspaper and magazine column titles occurs when
the title is the author's name or pseudonym, which is the case with a
number of syndicated columns. A mark consisting of a name is denied
registration as a trademark, since it comes within the specific exclusion in
section 2(e) (3) of the Lanham Act 43 which denies registration to a mark
that "is primarily merely a surname." This represents a change from the
previous act, which provided that a mark "merely in the name of an
individual" was not registrable, 44 and thus excluded both a full name and
a surname. Since the legislature changed the exclusion to "primarily
merely a surname" under general construction principles, this legislative
.change necessarily implies a different intention as to the registrability of
names.
The word "primarily" indicates a name clearly recognized as a
family name, as distinguished from a word which has a number of other
connotations; and the decisions substantiate this interpretation. In one
recent case, 45 the word "Rivera" as a trademark for watches was granted
registration because the purchasing public would not attach a surname
significance to it. Similarly, the name "Douglas" was held not to be "primarily merely a surname" because it has many other possible meanings. 46
While it would seem that the word "merely" in the statutory phrase
should be given its clear dictionary meaning, that is, "only" or "exclusively '47 the decisions are ambiguous on this point. Applications for
trademark registration of a full name rather than merely a surname
primarily recognized as such have generally been denied, 48 although the
case of Ex parte Dallioux 49 did allow registration of "Andre Dallioux" on

the grounds that the surname was not a dominant part of the work. However, a later case expressed doubt whether a mark composed of a
christian name and a surname, whether a pseudonym or not, was registrable.50 Thus, the courts are presently interpreting "primarily merely a
surname" as excluding from registration not only a surname, but also
the name of an individual if the surname contained therein has primary
significance to the consumer public as such.
43. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (3) (1964).
44. TRADE-MARK ACT § 5, 33 Stat. 724 (1905).
45. Ex parte Rivera Watch Corp., 106 U.S.P.Q. 145 (Comm'r Pat. 1955) ; See
Note, 24 GEo. WASH. L. Rev. 368 (1955).
46. Ex parte Omaha Cold Storage Co., 111 U.S.P.Q. 189 (Comm'r Pat. 1956).
The court did not elaborate on the other meanings of "Douglas."
47. This argument is justified since there was no discussion in the hearing on the
Lanham Act about the word "merely." Marks, Personal Names As Trade-Marks, 35
CHi. B. REc. 417 (1954).
48. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Watson, 204 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 829 (1953) (J. C. Higgins) ; Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Marzall, 94 F. Supp.
254 (D.D.C. 1950), aff'd, 196 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (combination of KimberlyClark).
49. 83 U.S.P.Q. 262 (Comm'r Pat. 1949).
50. Caralfoil-Silverman Co. v. Julette Originals, 99 U.S.P.Q. 142 (C.C.P.A. 1953)
(Paula Dean Originals).
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A determination that a mark is "primarily merely a surname" does
not preclude registration if it has acquired the requisite distinctiveness 5'
or secondary meanings.5 2 It must be established, however, that the significance attached to the mark by the consuming public relates to the origin or
source of the product, 53 rather than to the product itself. 54 The mark

must indicate to the public that the product was produced by a single
manufacturer, although his personal identity need not be known.5 5 Where
the author is considered the source, the prevailing interpretation appears
to be that his pseudonym is incapable of acquiring a secondary meaning
in connection with literary property.5 6 Consequently, the courts have held
7
that the use of an author's pseudonym as a title is not a trademark use.5
Establishing the secondary meaning of an author's name as a column
title presents a different problem where the publisher, rather than the
author, is considered the source of the article. Normally, the reading
public would not associate an author's pseudonym with the publisher of
the newspaper or magazine in which the column appeared. However, many
columns titled with the author's name are syndicated and sold to individual publishers, and it is the syndicate which is seeking registration.
In such cases, the relevant consideration is not the reading public's association of the mark with the publisher, but the significance of the name to
the purchaser of the column, that is, the individual newspaper publishers.5 8
This association may be more readily proved than any between the author's
name and the publisher which might be made by the reading public.
A final reason for denying trademark registration to the titles was
stated by the court in Application of Cooper as follows: "It is well known
that rights in book titles are afforded appropriate protection under the law
of unfair competition. '5 9 The scope of that protection must now be
explored.
51. 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1964)
[Niothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the
applicant which has become distinctive of the applicants' goods in commerce. The
Commissioner may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive . . .proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark
by the applicant in commerce for the five years next preceding the date of filing
of the application for its registration.
52. Grove Laboratories, Inc. v. Approved Pharmaceutical Corp., 149 F. Supp. 86
(N.D.N.Y. 1957).
53. Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961).
54. This is a question of fact. Travel Magazine, Inc. v. Travel Digest, Inc., 191
F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) ; Morse-Starrett Products Co. v. Steccone, 86 F. Supp.
796 (N.D. Cal. 1949), appeal dismissed, 191 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951).
55. Saalfield Publishing Co. v. G.&C. Merriam Co., 238 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1917),
cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917).
56. Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923'(9th Cir. 1951).
57. Richardson v. Norcross, 80 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1948).
58. Ex parte Checker Cab Mfg. Corp., 99 U.S.P.Q. 480 (Comm'r Pat. 1953).
The court held that in determining whether the trademark on the cabs indicates origin,
the question is not what the mark means to the riding public, but what it means to
the purchasers of taxi-cabs. Accord, Ex parte Gulf States Paper Corp., 101 U.S.P.Q.
464 (Comm'r Pat. 1954).
59. 254 F.2d 611, 617 (C.C.P.A. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958).
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UNFAIR COMPETITION IN TITLE CASES

Since titles are neither trademarkable nor copyrightable under the
federal acts, an action for infringement is clearly precluded. Thus, the
only existing protection afforded titles emanates from state laws of unfair
competition. Although not delineable into one clear theory, 60 state statutes
can be treated in two categories designed to prevent two distinct unfair
practices. Statutes in the first category are designed to prevent 61 the
passing off or palming off of one's goods as those of another and to protect
the public against confusion as to the source of the product and the
manufacturer against loss of good will. 62 The laws of unfair competition
also encompass inverse passing off, the tort of misappropriation. It exists
in situations where one appropriates another's endeavors for his own
benefit, and is designed to prevent a competitor from reaping a harvest
he has not sown.6 3 Literary titles have been afforded some measure of
protection from passing off,6 4 but not from misappropriation.6 5
A.

Passing Off

The common law tort of passing off, as applied to a title case, prevents
a competitor from using a duplicate or similar title which worud give rise
to the likelihood of public confusion as to the source of the work. In order
to establish that title simulation will cause confusion as to source, a
plaintiff generally must show a secondary meaning or source association
of his title. 66 To acquire such an association, a title, initially denied exclusive use because geographically or characteristically descriptive, becomes
associated in the consumer's mind with its source.67 To the consumer, the
publication bearing that title originates from a single source, although the
particular source need not be identified. 68
A variant of this approach, the stricter source motivation test, was
propounded by Judge Learned Hand in Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn &
60. In some states, passing off is the rule of law of unfair competition itself.
1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 4.1 (2d ed. 1950).

61. These terms are used interchangeably to designate the same unfair practice.
62. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916) ; Shaver v.

Heller & Merz Co., 108 Fed. 821 (8th Cir. 1901).

63. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
64. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.

1934)

(protected movie title Gold Diggers); Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co.,

26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939) (passing off book title Stella Dallas) ; Hemingway

v. Film Alliance of the United States, Inc., 174 Misc. 725, 21 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct.

1940) (protected play title The Fifth Column).
65. Gotham Music Service, Inc. v. Denton & Haskins Music Publishing Co., Inc.,
259 N.Y. 86, 181 N.E. 57 (1932) (The court refused to protect the song title Saint
James' Infirmary from misappropriation).
66. Some courts do not require the establishment of secondary meaning in order
to prove likeliness of confusion. Perfectform Corp. v. Perfect Brassiere Co., 256 F.2d
736 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 919 (1958) ; Avon Periodicals, Inc. v.
Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 282 App. Div. 200, 122 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1953).
67. G.&C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912).
68. Saalfield Publishing Co. v. G.&C. Merriam Co., 238 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1917),
cert. denied, 243 U.S. 651 (1917).
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Bishop Co. 69 This test was enunciated in a product simulation case and
requires a showing not only that the public believes the product to derive
from one source, but also that they are motivated to purchase it primarily
because of that source.70 Although source association implies source motivation, the effect of Judge Hand's test is to increase the burden on the
plaintiff to establish that the public desires to purchase his product primarily because he makes it. 71 However, the Crescent formulation has
received only limited approbation in the courts, and does not appear to
operate in the title area outside the Second Circuit.
The courts do not vary greatly on the definition of secondary meaning,
except insofar as the source association and the source motivation tests
differ. Divergence does occur, however, when these tests are applied to
the facts of a particular case.
The length of time necessary to acquire secondary meaning does not
conform to a set standard, although in practice a certain period of time
may become standardized for a factually similar class of cases. For example, titles of plays have received notable success in acquiring the requisite
secondary meaning in a limited time,7 2 even though the additional elements
of advertisement, promotion, and popularity perhaps play a significant
part. Book titles, on the other hand, have enjoyed somewhat lesser success,
presumably due to the length of time necessary to popularize a book.7 3
Extensive advertising and title exploitation prior to the release of a
literary product are not, however, necessarily determinative of secondary
meaning, 74 just as prior usage does not prevent a subsequent user from
acquiring the requisite source association for the same title, since secondary
meaning is based solely upon the public's association.7"
Secondary meaning is designed to illustrate a source significance in
order to establish likelihood of public confusion.7 6 The ultimate requirement for relief, likelihood of confusion, depends upon a number of factors.
69. 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
70. Id. at 300.

71. For a more extensive discussion of the Crescent formulation, see Developments

in the Law - Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. Rxv. 888, 912-15 (1964).
72. Hemingway v. Film Alliance of the United States, Inc., 174 Misc. 725, 21
N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (secondary meaning of the play The Fifth Column was
established in two and one-half months). In Jackson v. Universal International Pictures, Inc., 36 Cal. 2d 116, 222 P.2d 433 (1950), secondary meaning was attached to the
play Slightly Scandalous in three weeks. Curiously, the court declared that neither
the size of the public making the required association nor the popularity of the play
determines the acquisition of secondary meaning.
73. Johnston v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 82 Cal. App. 2d 796, 187
P.2d 474 (1947) (secondary meaning acquired in two years). However, in Collins v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 255 F. Supp. 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), rev'd on other
grounds, 106 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1939), the use of the book title Test Pilot for three years
did not establish secondary meaning. Likewise, in Curtis v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp., 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 295 P.2d 62 (1956). seven years was insufficient.
74. Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Souvaine Selective Pictures, Inc., 98 F.
Supp. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 192 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1951).
75. The test enunciated in G.&C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed. 369 (6th Cir.
1912), indicated the necessity of exclusiveness of use. This element is inconsistent
with the conceptual basis of secondary meaning, and is not a defense to an infringement action. Golenpaul v. Rosett, 174 Misc. 114, 18 N.Y.S.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
76. It is only necessary to show likelihood of confusion rather than actual confusion.
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Obviously, the competing title must be confusingly similar in appearance,
pronunciation, and color. Differences in appearances, such as spelling, may
be overcome by similar pronunciation, and vice versa. A striking difference
in color can also prevent confusion. The weight to be given these indicators
depends in part upon how discerning the purchasing public is with respect
to the particular product.7 7 Most book purchasers, for instance, are more
particular than people buying candy, and, therefore, a book title must
conform to a higher standard of similarity.
Likelihood of confusion by title duplication can be avoided by employing reasonable precautions. In one case,78 advertising. made it abundantly
clear that the defendants' movie was not based upon plaintiff's book, a
factor which the court weighted heavily to support its conclusion that
there was an absence of customer confusion.
Applying the standards of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion, titles have received protection from passing off in the courts. 79

B.

Misappropriation

The laws of unfair competition, once limited to the tort of passing off
with its attendant objective of preventing consumer confusion, have been
extended to include the tort of misappropriation, or inverse passing off.
This doctrine, which is applicable to cases where a competitor "passes off"
another's work as his own, received its first definitive statement in International News Serv. v. Associated Press.S0 INS, in order to curtail its
news-gathering expenses, copied news bulletins both from AP's bulletin
board and from the early editions of its member papers. Relying on the
equitable foundations of the laws of unfair competition, the Court upheld
an injunction preventing INS from appropriating AP's news until its
commercial value had ceased. Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority,
reasoned that AP had acquired a quasi-property right in the news it
gathered for release, and INS's appropriation constituted a clear fraud
upon AP's rights. 81 The Court thus included misappropriation, along with
the existing unfair practice of misrepresentation or passing off, within the
ambit of unfair competition.
77. For an analysis, see 3

CALLMAN,

UNFAIR

COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS

§ 81.2 (2d ed. 1950).
78. Curtis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 140 Cal. App. 2d 461, 295 P.2d
62 (1956).
79. Supra, note 64.

80. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). The Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403 (1916), normally cited to illustrate the misappropriation doctrine, was grounded
on the likelihood of confusion which was not an element of the misappropriation doctrine set forth in the INS case, supra.
81. It is suggested that the core of the Courts' argument was pragmatic. Inevitably, if INS continued to appropriate AP news, it could undercut AP's price and
cause a withdrawal of AP services leaving INS and the public without a source of
news. Developments in the Law Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REv. 888,
934 (1964).
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The misappropriation concept has received limited success in all but
a few jurisdictions.8 2 After Erie v. Tompkins, 3 federal courts were free
to disregard the concept since the INS case was decided as a matter of
federal common law, and they generally did so. Even in New York,
where the misappropriation concept has received approbation in a wide
variety of cases,84 the courts have failed to apply that doctrine in the few
decided title cases.8 5 In Gotham Music Serv., Inc. v. Denton Haskins Music
Publishing Co.,8 6 the plaintiff up-dated the song Gambler's Blues and retitled it St. James Infirmary. After extensive advertisement, the latter
version became popular. Defendant released' the same song under both
titles, obviously taking advantage of plaintiff's advertising campaign.
The court refused to grant an injunction because of plaintiff's failure to
establish a secondary meaning for the title, a requirement it deemed
essential for relief under its unfair competition laws. The dissenting
opinion, which contended that relief should be granted under the misappropriation doctrine in the INS case, left no doubt that the court
deliberately failed to discuss that concept.8 7 The federal courts in the
Second Circuit have likewise failed to prevent title appropriation under
8
the INS doctrine.
The above survey indicates that titles have received at least some
degree of protection under unfair competition doctrines. The continuing
extent of that protection must be evaluated, however, in light of the Sears
and Compco cases.
82. A number of jurisdictions have rejected the doctrine all together, e.g.,
Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. American Expansion Bolt & Mfg. Co., 124 F.2d
706 (7th Cir. 1941); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. New England Newspaper Publishing Co., 46 F. Supp. 198 (D. Mass. 1942).
83. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
84. Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133 (1921) (use of cartoon characters) ; Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 279 App. Div.
632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1951) (record duplication) ; Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 425, 155
N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956)
(pirating of dress designs).
85. It appears from a cursory glance that the court in Avon Periodicals, Inc. v.
Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 282 App. Div. 200, 122 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1953), granted relief
on the basis of misappropriation. Although the title of the plaintiff's magazine
had not acquired secondary meaning, the court held that defendant's magazine was
similar, and public confusion was likely to result. This holding is an adjunct of the
passing off doctrine which relies on public confusion rather than the misappropriation
doctrine which relies solely on appropriating another's commercial advantage, regardless of fraud on the public. See Speedy Prods., Inc. v. Dri Mark Prods., Inc., 271
F.2d 646, 650 n.1 (2d Cir. 1959). The case of McGraw-Hill Book Co. v. Random
House, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 704, 225 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1962), however recognized
the application of misappropriated doctrine in a title area, but in that case there was
no evidence of appropriation.
86. 259 N.Y. 86, 181 N.E. 57 (1932).
87. The rationale behind the majority's decision in Gotham balances the public's
interest with that of the defrauded manufacturers. Since the song Gambler's Blues
was in the public domain, the name of the song, the title, was also in the public
domain. However, the plaintiff was seeking to regain the exclusive use of St. James'
Infirmary, not Gambler's Blues.
88. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 268 (1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 952 (1958). "Titles are protected only to the extent necessary to prevent
confusion on the part of the public as to the identity of the composition covered by the
title." Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Souvaine Selective Pictures, Inc., 98 F. Supp 774
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 192 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1951).
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AND CoMpco ON TITLE PROTECTION

The Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.8 9 and its
companion case, Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,90 concluded
that certain aspects of the state laws on unfair competition are preempted since they conflict with federal policy. It is necessary to consider
the impact of these decisions upon the laws of unfair competition.
In Sears, plaintiff alleged that defendant had marketed a pole lamp
which copied the non-functional features of plaintiff's lamp, thereby infringing upon the latter's patent and causing confusion in the trade as to
source. The district court invalidated the patents for want of invention,
but nonetheless found defendant guilty of violating Illinois unfair competition laws on the ground that confusion was likely to result, even though
no secondary meaning had been established. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a state may neither prohibit the copying of an article, unpatented and uncopyrighted, nor award damages for such copying.
In the Compco case, plaintiff alleged that defendant copied his
patented lighting fixture. The district court likewise invalidated the
patents for lack of invention, but again found the defendant guilty of
engaging in unfair competition. However, unlike the Sears case, secondary
meaning was held to have been established. The Supreme Court again
reversed, holding that a state cannot hold a copier of an unpatented article
accountable in damages for failure to prevent consumer confusion, except
to the extent that such failure violated state statutory or decisional law
requiring labeling or some other precautionary measure.
B.

Applicability to Copyright

In essence, the court determined from the persuasive nature of the
patent clause that it necessarily preempts state law in the area;9I since
Congress exhausted its full constitutional authority to protect inventiveness when it passed the Patent Act, the standards of patentability necessarily correspond to the standards of inventiveness under the patent
clause. 92 Consequently, articles such as those in Sears and Compco which
fail to qualify for federal protection are beyond the realm of permissible
93
state regulation.
Mr. Justice Black's opinion proceeded on the theory that the patent
clause struck a tenuous balance between the competitive policies expressed
89. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
90. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).

91. The Court ascribes to Congress the intention to have a uniform federal system
of patents and copyrights from the exclusive jurisdiction to hear copyright and patent
cases granted to the federal court. 376 U.S. 225, 231 n.7 (1964).

92. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).

93. This theory of constitutional preemption is not new, but it is only occasionally
used. An example of its use is in the maritime law dealing with workmen's compensation. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
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in the anti-monopoly laws and the public's interest in securing continuous
progress in the arts and sciences. As any variations engendered by state
laws would necessarily disturb this equilibrium in contravention to the
constitutional mandate, the states must be barred from affecting the scope
of this federally-sanctioned monopoly.
Although the Sears and Compco decisions specifically involved unpatened articles, the rationale of those cases clearly requires that a similar
result obtain in the copyright area, 94 at least with respect to published
works. 95 Any extension of the scope of protection afforded authors under
federal law would represent an independent determination by the states of
the circumstances sufficient to justify withholding a work from the public
domain.
C.

The Permissible Scope of Continued State Regulation

Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court in the Sears case, carved out
an exception to the otherwise pervasive preemption of Sears and Compco:
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that
goods, whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as
to the source, just as it may protect businesses in the use of their
trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the packaging of goods so
as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading
purchasers as to the source of the goods. 96
In effect, then, while the states are powerless to prevent simulation of
an article or literary work, they remain free to impose labeling requirements
in order "to prevent customer confusion." Nor do these decisions in any
way impugn the states' continued competence to prohibit a manufacturer
from passing off his goods by duplicating another's mark or label and
thereby cause customer confusion.9 7
94. In Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTV, Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 350 n.1 (9th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1964), the court stated: "The principles announced in
Sears and Compco . . . are equally applicable to patent and copyright law." However,
unlike the relationship between the Patent Act and the patent clause, there is a gap
between a work which is copyrightable as a writing under the Copyright Act and one
which is a copyrightable as a writing within the copyright clause. Some articles, such
as phonograph records, have been declared a writing within the copyright clause, but
too lacking in originality to be afforded protection under the Copyright Act. 1965
COPYRIGHT LAW REviSION 3.
95. Supra, note 23.
96. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964).
97. Mr. Justice Black elaborated upon the states' retention of power in the trademark and labeling area in the Compco case:
A State of course has power to impose liability upon those who, knowing that
the public is relying upon an original manufacturer's reputation for quality and
integrity, deceive the public by palming off their copies as the original. . . . And
of course a State cannot hold a copier accountable in damages for failure to label
or otherwise to identify his goods unless his failure is in violation of valid state
statutory or decisional law requiring the copier to label or take other precautions
to prevent confusion of customers as to the source of the goods.
376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964). In a footnote to this language (376 U.S. at 239 n.5),
Mr. Justice Black pointed out that no such law requiring labeling exists at the present
time in Illinois.
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It has been pointed out that sanctioning state-imposed labeling requirements in the copyright area does not significantly undermine the
Court's competitive objectives; for a copier's otherwise unqualified right
to use an uncopyrighted work is only limited in situations where there is,
a likelihood of consumer confusion with regard to the simulated article. 98.
Indeed, it might well have the effect of encouraging a copier to improve
upon the copy in order to enhance his own reputation.
D. Subsequent State Court Decisions
Since states may thus "prevent customers from being misled as to
source," it becomes necessary to determine what factors must be established
to demonstrate the existence of such confusion. One possibility is to regard
secondary meaning - the source association previously regarded as essen-1
tial to proof of customer confusion where non-technical marks were concerned - as a necessary prerequisite. Such an approach would afford
some limited protection to consumers without seriously infringing upon
federally-created uniformity, and appears to have found the greatest acceptance with the courts.
This position is illustrated by the recent decision of Spangler Candy
Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 99 where the manufacturer of "Dum-Dums"
lollipops sued to enjoin usage of similar packaging under the name of
"Pop-Pops." The same court which had granted relief in the Sears case
in the absence of secondary meaning' 00 denied the injunction against defendant's alleged passing off on the grounds that secondary meaning had
not been established. In thus interpreting Sears as indicating that the
only interest against which a manufacturer can claim protection is customer confusion, the court impliedly abolished the tort of misappropriation.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, 1 1 although not specifically requiring
secondary meaning, determined that no unfair competition existed after
Sears and Compco unless there was passing off or an attempt to deceive or
mislead the public as to origin.
Other federal courts, however, continue to grant relief for the tort
of misappropriation. This position was adopted by the Second Circuit in
Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp.,10 2 where it was held that
Sears and Compco did not preclude a state from granting protection to a
mark misappropriated by another. The court declared that existing state
law was still controlling, and that the New York courts could continue to
apply the misappropriation doctrine of the INS case by distinguishing
between copying an idea and producing a product, and appropriating that
98. Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 101, 123 (1965), contains an excellent discussion of
the impact of Sears and Compco.
99. 235 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Il1. 1964), aff'd, 147 U.S.P.Q. 434 (1965).
100. The District Court's opinion is summarized in Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 313 F.2d 115, 116-17 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
101. Aerosol Research Co. v. Scovill Mfg. Co., 334 F.2d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1964).
102. 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913 (1965).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1966

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 4 [1966], Art. 11
SUMMER 1966]

COMMENTS
M

product initially. As no fraud or deception upon the public need be established according to those cases, secondary meaning was irrelevant.
Two recent decisions typify this approach; in one,' 03 defendant record
company reproduced a Beatle tune from plaintiff's recording, while in
another,10 4 a substantial segment of a motion picture exclusively licensed to
plaintiff's television station was exhibited on defendant's station. Characterizing these acts as appropriation rather than copying, the courts granted
the requested relief on the basis of the INS doctrine. While the courts
were no doubt appalled by actions amounting almost to thievery, their
granting of relief under the misappropriation doctrine virtually granted
copyrights to the defendants and directly contravened the mandate of
Sears and Cornpco.105

E.

Continuing State Competence to Regulate Titles

Applying the majority position to the area of literary works, and
more particularly individual titles, it appears that the states may not prohibit the copying of an uncopyrighted or uncopyrightable work, as was
previously accomplished by both the misappropriation and passing off
doctrines. It would seem, however, that they do retain the power to
prevent an author from passing off his work by utilizing another's title
where that title has acquired secondary meaning, although the type of
relief is now limited. Since a title is the only name for the work, the
states should be limited to setting labeling requirements in order to
prevent the likelihood of customer confusion. As titles are not copyrightable, to allow the states to prohibit a copier from using another's title
would be to sanction a monopoly not condoned by the Copyright Act.
Preventing a copier from using a title which constitutes the only name
of a work would effectively preclude him from marketing his copy.

V.

ADVISABILITY OF AMENDING

THE COPYRIGHT

ACT

The restrictive effect of Sears and Compco upon title protection
by the states makes it clear that the only possible source of more effective
safeguards lies with federal trademark or copyright legislation. The former
appears extremely unlikely, however, in light of the several objections to
allowing both to operate with respect to titles.
103. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d
553 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
104. Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 22 App. Div. 778, 254
N.Y.S.2d 36 (1964).
105. Accord, Treece, Patent Policy and Preemption: The Stiffel and Colnpco Cases,
32 U. Cni. L. Rvv. 80, 94 (1964) ; Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. Rv. 1289,
1318 (1940) ; 1965 COPYRIGHT LAW RvissoN 85: "In some States it [unfair competition] was greatly broadened to become, under the name misappropriation, the virtual
equivalent of a copyright; and it has been cut back, by the Supreme Court's decision
in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., to the traditional concept of passing off."
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Since a copyright is of limited duration, 10 6 while the only limit on
trademarks is use, trademark protection would deprive the public of the
right to call the copy by the only name it has, even after the copyright
had expired. 10 7 Thus, the originator would in effect be granted a monopoly,
a result specifically foreclosed by the policy considerations of Sears and
Compco.
Copyright protection of original titles, on the other hand, along with
the work itself, would give an author the opportunity to exploit his title
during the copyright period while preserving the public's right to thereafter call the copy by its name. Allowing an author to profit from his
endeavors to the exclusion of others should meet with no objection so
long as it does not prejudice the public interest. Indeed, such an approach
has been adopted in a number of foreign jurisdictions to circumvent possible
conflict between the two statutes.' 0 8
Extension of copyright protection to original titles, however, raises
a number of problems, the most significant of which is the constitutionality
of such legislation. It is submitted that the modification of the Trade-Mark
cases affected by Bleistein has placed original titles within the copyright
clause, while leaving them beyond the scope of the present Copyright Act.
Under this analysis, Congress could constitutionally amend the existing
act to encompass titles.
A further objection is that registration of titles would substantially
increase the administrative burden on the Copyright Office. 10 9 But against
this position must be balanced the fact that if titles were to become
registrable, it is probable that application for a title copyright would be
required to coincide with the application for copyright of the work itself;
thus, the added burden on the Copyright Office would be minimal.
Finally, it has been argued that copyright of titles would secure monopolies in words and phrases and remove them from the English language. 110
This position fails to consider the fact that a copyright protects only
the form and manner of stating particular words, not the words and phrases
themselves."' Another author would remain free to utilize such words,
although not in the precise order as the originator.
Unfortunately, the proposed copyright law revision will exclude titles
as copyrightable subject matter.1 12 This bill, initially proposed by the
106. The duration of a copyright is twenty-eight years with a twenty-eight year
renewal option. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1964). The copyright revision bill proposes to change
the duration to the life of the author and 50 years after his death. 1965 COPYRIGIIT
LAW REvISION § 234.
107. Application of Cooper, 254 F.2d 611, 616 (C.C.P.A. 1958), cert. denied, 358

U.S. 840 (1958).

108. See Klein, Is Unauthorized Use of Titles of Artistic Works in Unrelated

Fields Actionable Piracy?, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 59, 91-93 (1961).
109.

WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION RIGHTS,

§

243, 1055 (1953).

110. Ibid.
111. Netterville & Hirsch, Piracy and Privilege in Literary Titles, 32 So. CAL. L.
REv. 101, 110 (1959).
112. 1965 COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION §§ 102-03.
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Register of Copyrights, is designed to make it clear that while the preemption established by Sears and Compco does not preclude state remedies
that are different in nature from copyright, such as the unauthorized use
11 3
of the title of a work in such a way as to constitute passing off or fraud,
it does exclude protection from misappropriation, the virtual equivalent
of a copyright.'

14

VI.

CONCLUSION

The effect of the Sears and Cornpco decisions under the preceding
analysis, is to preclude the states from enjoining misappropriation while
leaving them free to prevent passing off where customer confusion is
likely. The permissible remedy, however, is not to enjoin the copier's
usage of the originator's title, but rather to require him to label his copy
so as to obviate confusion as to source. Thus, the already limited protection
afforded titles has been further diminished.
Nor is there any immediate likelihood of an amendment to the present
Copyright Act which would bring titles under the mantle of federal protection. Indeed, the proposed bill now under consideration makes no
mention of the title area.
Nonetheless, it appears that authors are presently being denied protection of an extremely valuable product, and one which in many instances
is highly original.
Peter C. John
113. 1965 COPYRIGHT
114. Ibid.

LAW REVISION

84--85.
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